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The Fighter-Bomber in the 
Normandy Campaign 
The Role of 83 Group 
Christopher Evans 
ry-\le dichotomy between popular and academic 
l. history is, for most historians, and readers, 
an uncomfortable one. A book that appeals to a 
mass audience risks the scorn of academia, 
whereas a scholarly work may never reach 
beyond the confines of the university. While there 
are exceptions to this rule, John Keegan's The 
Face of Battle being perhaps the most famous, 
by and large academic study runs parallel with 
popular accounts and rarely the twain meet. No 
where is this more prevalent in the study of 
military history than the question of the role 
played by tactical air power in the Normandy 
campaign. With over a half century of intense 
study and voluminous publication this subject 
continues to defy a comprehensive reconciliation. 
It has therefore remained an area of constant 
debate. 
The Royal Air Force and Royal Canadian Air 
Force, their proponents and certainly their pilots, 
have argued that their contribution to the victory 
in Normandy was vital, even decisive. Memoirs 
abound filled with the bravado of heroic acts so 
compelling that their tales have swept the day. 
Frank Wootton's painting, "Rocket-firing 
Typhoons at the Falaise Gap, Normandy, 1944," 
has come to epitomize this most positive view of 
the tank-killing fighter-bomber. The commanding 
officer of the Second Tactical Air Force, Air 
Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham, stated this 
sentiment clearly in his postwar report on 
operations. 1 George C. Blackburn, a gunner, 
concurred with this view in his award-winning 
book The Guns of Normandy: 
Surely the Typhoon is proving to be the most 
effective weapon of all in combating the 
superiority of the enemy's armour, particularly 
his irresistible Tigers. Without the Typhoons, 
the Allies might never have subdued his 
armoured divisions to the point where a break-
out became possible. 2 
Despite such overwhelming support for the 
destructive powers of allied air power a group of 
historians undertook the unenviable task of 
questioning the myth of the tank-killing fighter-
bomber. W.A. Jacobs, Terry Copp and Robert 
Vogel were among the first to publish studies 
based on operational research reports.:; 
Operational research involved the study of the 
battlefield and the effectiveness, or lack thereof, 
of the weapons employed. Data accumulated by 
scientists of No.2 Operational Research Section, 
combing the battlefields of Normandy, pointed 
to something quite different than the pilots 
were claiming. Panthers, Tigers, Mk. IVs and 
assault guns certainly littered the Normandy 
landscape. However, close examination 
revealed that their demise was most often due 
to ground fire, mechanical defect, destruction 
by crew or lack of fuel. What then had tactical 
air power achieved? If The Day of the Typhoon' 
was more myth than reality, what was the 
contribution made by the pilots risking and 
often losing their lives in repeated ground 
attacks?4 Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, the 
German general specifically tasked with repelling 
the invasion forces, gave one possible answer: 
Our own operations are rendered extraordinarily 
difficult and in part impossible to carry out 
[owing to] the exceptionally strong and, in some 
respects overwhelming, superiority of the enemy 
air force. The enemy has complete command of 
the air over the battle zone and up to about 100 
kilometres behind the front and cuts off by day 
almost all traffic on roads. [ -] Neither our flak 
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nor the Luftwaffe seem capable of putting a 
stop to this crippling and destructive operation 
of the enemy's aircraft." 
Shortly thereafter the Field Marshal was 
seriously injured when his staff car was strafed, 
at of all places, Ste. Fay de Montgommery. He 
never took to the field of battle again. Allied 
tactical air power was assured its place in 
history. 
A recent book on the subject, Air Power at 
the Battlefront: Allied Close Air Support in 
Europe. 1943-1945 by Ian Gooderson has 
expanded on this perception. Far less satisfying 
than the destruction of enemy tanks and far 
harder to prove, Gooderson cites the creation of 
negative morale as an important factor. Put 
simply, even if the fighter-bomber did not destroy 
the Tiger tank or knock out the concrete pill-box, 
it could and often did terrify and throw into 
confusion the soldiers within, thereby lessening 
their ability to fight. A less palpable result 
perhaps but a significant one nonetheless. But 
is this new understanding of tactical air power, 
based on contemporary studies, the whole story? 
The answer is no. 
The historiography regarding the 
effectiveness of tactical air power in Normandy 
has focused so tightly on one aspect, the provision 
of close or direct support - attacking ground 
targets on or near the battlefield - that it has 
not fully encompassed the larger picture. All 
can agree that the Second Tactical Air Force 
was tasked with providing support to the 
ground forces in Normandy. What must be first 
clarified is how that support was actually 
provided. Only then can an attempt at 
quantifying its success be undertaken. The 
degree to which close support operations 
succeeded or failed becomes less crucial if the 
evidence shows that missions of a defensive 
and protective nature were the primary focus 
of tactical air power operations in Normandy, 
not close support. 
With the end of the First World War the 
concept of strategic bombing was to come to the 
fore in Britain and remain there throughout the 
interwar period. At a 1924 RAF Air Staff Planning 
committee meeting it was made clear that the 
development of dedicated attack aviation was 
"quite unsuited to the needs of this country and 
that it would be impossible to produce [-]without 
starving far more important branches of the 
RAF. "6 Said branches were those concerned with 
the development oflong range strategic bombers 
and short range defensive fighters. The design 
and production of ground attack aircraft, with 
their implied support of an army engaged in a 
land campaign, was therefore ignored. By 1935 
this attitude was firmly ingrained, so much so 
A Canadian pilot poses in front qf his Hawker Typhoon. 
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Ground crew prepare a Hawker Typhoonjor its next mission. 
that the same committee concluded that "an 
airforce whose primary function is direct 
cooperation with the army in a large scale 'land 
forces' war- [is] neither the role of the Royal Air 
Force in war, nor in its 'imperial police' duties."7 
It therefore rejected "the idea of armouring 
aircraft for use in the RAF" despite the likelihood 
of"low flying attacks against ground targets in 
the future. "8 Instead. existing aircraft would be 
utilized if required. 
In 1942 the RAF remained confident in the 
ability of strategic bombing and continued to see 
little need in pursuing closer ties with the army 
in developing ground attack aircraft and doctrine. 
The Air Staff stated that with: 
the highest priority and sufficient energy I -I 
devoted to the development of a coordinated day 
and night bomber offensive - the war can 
certainly be won in 1944. and possibly in 1943.9 
The army, however, did not see it this way. The 
same year that the RAF were predicting an end 
to the war through bombing, the British 
Imperial General Staff circulated a paper calling 
for no less than 109 squadrons to directly 
support ground forces. The circular noted that 
"Army Co-operation has been the Cinderella 
branch of the RAF, and the Army's efforts to 
get proper air support in reconnaissance, 
bombing and fighter cover has never had a fair 
deal. "10 When it was finally decided to create a 
tactical air force to support land operations, 
with the tacit acknowledgment by the RAF that 
strategic bombing was not going to win the war, 
it was too late to build an entirely new 
organization and equipment. Tactical air power 
would therefore have to come from existing 
commands and aircraft, even though neither 
were specifically designed for the task. 
In the summer of 1943 the Second Tactical 
Air Force was created in England. Among its key 
components was 83 Composite Group. The 
organization, especially 83 Group, was in reality 
Fighter Command with a new name and new 
mission. Since the successful defense of the 
British Isles, Fighter Command had been in 
23 
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search of a new role. This situation was 
exacerbated in the summer of 1941 when 
virtually all Luftwaffe fighter and bomber 
squadrons stationed in western Europe were 
transferred to the new eastern front in Russia. 
Fighter Command was in danger of becoming 
redundant. Bomber Command had the range and 
weapons to take the offensive to Germany, Fighter 
Command did not. The Hurricane, already 
obsolete in Europe, and its uncertain 
replacement, the Typhoon and the updated 
Spitfire, had all been designed for air defense. 
As a result, they lacked the range to escort the 
heavy bombers deep into occupied territory. The 
compromise, as a way to utilize such a sizeable 
asset, maintain morale and with the hope of 
drawing some of the Luftwaffe squadrons away 
from Russia, was to conduct offensive sweeps 
over occupied France and the Low countries. 
With the fighter squadrons now taking the 
fight to the enemy, aspects of fighter aircraft 
design, previously irrelevant, became critical. 
Very quickly Air Vice Marshal Leigh-Mallory, AOC-
in-C Fighter Command concluded that "the best 
type of aircraft for low flying attack was the radial 
engined fighter. "11 This was disturbing. Fighter 
Command possessed no such fighter. The only 
new fighter added to the roster of what would 
later become 83 Group was the ubiquitous 
Mustang, another liquid cooled inline engined 
fighter. Leigh-Mallory's remark stemmed from the 
quite heavy losses that were incurring on these 
offensive sweeps. All four fighter types had their 
radiators and cooling systems located on the 
bottom of the aircraft. While this offered 
protection from an enemy airplane shooting from 
behind, it presented ground fire, flak, with a very 
vulnerable target. Prewar decisions to forego a 
dedicated ground attack aircraft with sufficient 
armour protection now took on a darker 
connotation. 
As offensive operations continued, other 
problems began to emerge. Fighter pilots had not 
been trained to drop bombs or fire rockets at 
ground targets and their aircraft had not been 
built to do so either. Studies concluded that 
fighters equipped with bombs, flying at just 50 
feet above the ground, would need to drop 60 
bombs to hit a target 150 feet square, and this 
with no enemy opposition. Raise the height to 
a still low 1,000 feet, and the amount of flak to 
moderate and the number of bombs required 
24 
jumped to a staggering 4,000. By the time 
fighters were up at 10,000 feet and 
experiencing intense flak the number of bombs 
required was ridiculous; 50,000. 12 The desire 
of the pilot to survive in the face of ground fire 
and the unsuitability of fighters converted to 
bombers proved anathema to accuracy. 
The use of rockets was equally difficult. By 
August 1943 the rocket projectile was regarded 
as a weapon best used against large targets as it 
was deemed not a "precision weapon."13 This then 
left strafing as the first and most accurate means 
by which a fighter could attack ground targets. 
Against soft targets such as transport and troops 
in the open such attacks proved to be devastating. 
However, the .303 and 20mm shells fired by the 
fighters were virtually useless against tanks and 
well fortified positions. In essence then, the most 
accurate weapon fighters had with which to 
conduct ground attack was also its weakest. This 
was worrisome. The vaunted Panther and Tiger 
tanks were viewed with varying states of awe and 
fear by the men of the western armies who would 
soon have to face them in numbers that in terms 
of density surpassed those on the eastern front. 
The army's hopes that the air force could deal 
directly with these adversaries was to prove 
illusory. 
Air Superiority 
'l '1 ]hen the allies came ashore in France on 
VV 6 June 1944, the role of the supporting air 
forces was deemed crucial. With the advantage 
of hindsight the then very real chance of the allies 
being pushed back into the sea seems of little 
importance. To the leaders of the time however, 
it remained an ominous possibility. Dieppe was 
an all too graphic reminder of what could go 
wrong. First and foremost then, the fighters of 
the tactical air forces were tasked with gaining 
and maintaining air superiority over the battle 
area. It was a task they were supremely suited to 
carry out. 
Air Marshal Tedder commented after the 
war that "even though one 'felt' the air situation 
was satisfactory one must admit to a certain 
degree of anxiety- it would have needed only a 
small surviving enemy force to do immense 
damage during the initial landings. "14 To negate 
the German Air Force as much as possible the 
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tactical air forces continued the offensive against 
the Luftwaffe. Airfields and infrastructure were 
attacked, escort patrols for bomber and fighter-
bomber formations were provided, defensive 
patrols were conducted over the sea and land 
forces and fighter sweeps behind enemy lines 
continually sought out any German aircraft in 
the sky. Their efforts proved extremely successful. 
During the period 6 June through 30 June the 
Luftwaffe sunk a mere five vessels and damaged 
another seven. Over 5,000 ships were crowded 
in the narrow confines of the English Channel 
and Normandy beachhead yet the Luftwaffe 
destroyed but a fraction of them. 15 It was at this 
point, when allied armour and infantry were at 
their most vulnerable, that the Luftwaffe could 
have struck a severe, even crippling, blow. Its 
failure to do so, as well as its inability to disrupt 
the massive naval artillery that was brought to 
bear on German targets far inshore with 
devastating results, is an often-overlooked but 
significant contribution that tactical air power 
made to the land campaign. 
Intelligence 
T he reconnaissance fighters of 83 Group provided as great a service as those aircraft 
directly attacking the enemy: 
they kept a general watch on road and rail 
movement and on shipping: they flew over rivers 
to observe barge movement: bridging and 
ferrying sites: they made detailed searches of 
specific areas at the request of Twenty One Army 
Group to detect possible concentrations for 
counter- attacks. They also carried out 
intelligence missions in search of gun-sites, 
dumps, supply centres, etc .. and for purposes 
of bomb damage assessment. 16 
A measure of just how active reconnaissance 
aircraft were during the campaign is the sheer 
volume of photographs taken in such a short 
span of time [see Table 1]. These photographs 
were distributed widely, often down to the platoon 
level. providing the ground forces with up-to-date 
information on enemy dispositions, thereby 
allowing for a more informed plan of attack. 
Information was to come from other sources too. 
With fighter aircraft operating almost constantly 
over forward enemy positions on other missions 
they constantly reported back on what they saw, 
supplementing the dedicated reconnaissance 
squadrons many times over. 18 
Table 1 
Production of Air Photographs by 83 Group 
during the Normandy Campaign17 
No. of No. of No. of Month Successful 
Sortes Exposures Prints 
June 446 34,000 287,000 
July 299 33,000 380,000 
August 495 76,000 814,000 
Totals 1,240 143,000 1,481,000 
Armed Reconnaissance and 
Interdiction 
I\ rmed reconnaissance meant that "fighter 
.1""\aircraft [were] sent out to look for ground 
targets and attack them. At the same time, pilots 
bring back any possible information about the 
enemy ground situation. "19 Missions would 
involve anywhere from 4 to 12 aircraft "sweeping 
the given area at a height of about 4,000 to 6,000 
feet, according to the flak concentrations present, 
and searching for any form of road, rail or water-
borne movement. "20 So numerous were these 
missions that German road movement was 
virtually confined to the hours after dark or in 
bad weather when the marauding aircraft 
would not be present. 
Interdiction "was usually carried out in a 
fairly calm period before the land battle really 
joined, and consisted of cutting off completely 
A photo-reconnaissance Mustang I of 430 Squadron 
RCAF in Normandy. CFPU PL 34965 
25 
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A Typhoon of 438 Squadron RCAF being serviced. In the foreground are two 
bombs ready to be fitted. a 1 000-pounder (bottom) and a 500-pounder. 
the area in which the enemy was situated by 
carrying out bombing attacks on all lines of 
communication leading to the area. "21 Armed 
reconnaissance was an integral part of 
interdiction and sought to starve the forward 
German defences of food, fuel, ammunition and 
reinforcements. The ability to quantify the 
success of these missions however, remains 
difficult. Postwar reports however, especially 
those given by German generals, were vociferous 
in noting the constant and destructive effect allied 
air power had on their ability to conduct 
operations: 
Our daily losses in men and material from close 
support planes and fighter bombers were high 
in good weather. Their effect on the morale of 
our soldiers was considerable. On the other 
hand, the enemy suffered practically no losses 
from our planes. 
[ -1 All our movements [ -1 could, during clear 
weather, only be accomplished during the night 
(six to eight hours). During these few hours, we 
experienced overloading of the road and railroad 
network with resulting trafficjams. 22 
The consequences of this were: 
26 
(l) All our movements could be executed only 
slowly, and with many difficulties and losses. 
It was therefore necessary to plan in advance 
and prepare those movements very thoroughly. 
(2) The enemy was able to execute his 
movements at least twice as fast as we carried 
out ours. 
(3) Movements of our units during daytime and 
good weather bogged down because of air 
attacks and caused heavy losses. 
(4) The supply situation was bound to become 
increasingly difficult. 
(5) The moving up of reinforcements was a 
tedious operation. Delays entailing critical 
situations had to be taken into account. 2 " 
Direct/ Close Air Support 
~e general term 'direct air support' was used 
J. as a catch all to describe "the attack by air 
forces of targets having an immediate effect upon 
the action of our own land forces and may be 
divided into prearranged and impromptu 
support."24 In either case this support was 
primarily concerned with ground attack which 
entailed strafing, bombing and I or rocketing of 
specific targets near the front lines and in close 
proximity to allied forces. For such missions 
communication between the ground forces and 
pilots was essential, and various methods were 
employed. The one most famous was known as 
"CABRANK" which consisted of a group of 
orbiting aircraft being directed by a ground 
controller onto a specific target. 
Despite its fame, CABRANK was never in 
widespread use. It was a costly and difficult way 
to employ aircraft and offered no guarantees of a 
target being located. More often, when aircraft 
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attacked targets near the front line, they adhered 
to the bombline for guidance. As the name 
suggests a line was delineated on the field of battle 
that determined on which side an atrcraft could 
safely engage targets. Geographic landmarks 
were used to give pilots visual clues but this was 
not always sufficient. In that case any number of 
artificial indicators were employed to signal to 
aircraft where the allied troops were in relation 
to the Germans. These signals included strips of 
cloth laid out on the ground, coloured smoke 
or flares, trenches made with bulldozers or graters 
and even white paint dtrectly on a road. 25 As the 
ingenuity of the allied soldier was limited only by 
what he could lay his hands on, the amount 
and type of signal markers was numerous. 
When the campaign evolved into one of 
rapid movement. these methods were no longer 
suitable and so another means of identification 
Reece photos qf the 
German exodus in the 
Falaise Pocket. 
Right: At this 
crossroads near 
Orbec. clearly defined 
traclc maries indicate 
where vehicles on the 
escape route make a 
detour to pass 
wrecked transport 
blocking the road. 
Below: Close paclced 
German vehicles 
(including cars. trucks. 
AFVs and horse-drawn 
carts) spotted by a 
reconnaissance 
aircrq[t east qf Falaise 
on the hazardous 
escape routes toward 
the Seine River: 
was required. The front line would be 'predicted' 
and pilots would be told to attack in areas that 
the prediction indicated was enemy and not 
allied. 26 Overly optimistic predictions would place 
the Germans within the allied side, offering them 
a greater degree of protection while a pessimistic 
one could find allied troops further forward than 
expected and so subject to attack by their own 
aircraft. The system, while far from ideal, sufficed 
in most cases. 
The culmination of the Normandy campaign 
was the "Battle of the Falaise Pocket." When the 
"Pocket" was finally liquidated a rough tally was 
made of the destroyed and abandoned vehicles 
left in and around Falaise. There was so much 
wreckage that the area was divided into three 
portions, the Pocket. the Shambles and the 
Chase. A total of 885 vehicles was counted in the 
Pocket area, 3,043 in the Shambles and another 
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3,648 in the Chase for a total of 7,576 vehicles, 
not including the innumerable horse-drawn 
carts, in this one section of Normandy aloneY 
When the vehicles were categorized by type and 
their condition assessed it became clear that 
strafing, not bombs and rockets, had been the 
main cause of destruction of vehicles attacked 
from the air. Of the 150 tanks and self-propelled 
guns located in the Chase, not a single one 
showed signs of having been destroyed from 
the air. 28 Even so, it is equally clear that at 
least some of the German armour found was 
there because of air attack on fuel trucks, 
blocked roads and bridges and even the 
demoralization of the crew. 
In this final battle ofthe Normandy campaign 
the pilots of 83 Group claimed the destruction 
of 141 tanks and 2,284 motorized enemy 
transport (MET). 29 While the evidence suggests 
that these claims are exaggerated, the fact 
remains that the battle ofthe Falaise Pocket was 
a defeat comparable to that suffered by the 
Germans at Stalingrad. In the span of just three 
months two German armies had been mauled 
and routed, and the air forces had played their 
part. What has remained controversial ever since 
was how exactly that contribution was made. 
A breakdown of the numbers and types of 
missions flown by the tactical air forces [shown 
in Tables 2 and 3] is instructive in assessing their 
contribution. Excluding the light and medium 
bombers and focusing just on the fighter aircraft 
one can see that for the first two months of the 
campaign over 50 percent of all fighter sorties 
were air superiority missions in some form. 
When the month of August is included the total 
drops to 42 percent, still far and away the single 
largest number of sorties flown by the fighters in 
the composite groups in 2nd TAF. The actual 
percentage of missions termed direct or close 
air support was just 19 percent of the total 
effort expended. That bears repeating. Less 
than 20 percent of all fighter and fighter I 
bomber sorties flown throughout the entirety 
of the Normandy campaign were of the specific 
type, direct/ close support, that the army 
wanted. The remaining 80 percent followed the 
doctrine argued by the RAF, support through 
air superiority, interdiction and intelligence 
gathering. 
Table 2 
Month 
June 
July 
August 
Totals 
Month 
June 
July 
August 
Totals 
28 
Effort expended on obtaining and maintaining Air Supremacy30 
Number of effective sorties flown by all groups 
Offensive 83 and 84 
Patrols Interception Escort Total 85 Group Group 
4,716 4,692 3,134 12,542 1,488 11,054 
4,548 135 3,869 8,552 1,294 7,258 
1,035 3,009 2,751 6,795 916 5,879 
10,299 7,836 9,754 27,889 3,698 24,191 
Table 3 
Sorties by Aircraft of 2 TAF during the Normandy Campaign:11 
Photo, 
Medium & Fighter Fighter weather Armed visual and Light Escort & Bomber& Reece tactical Total Bombing Patrols RP attacks* 
recce and 
ASR 
3,117 18,062 7,652 5,277 3,810 37,918 
3,304 14,528 6,484 5,527 3,025 32,868 
3,990 7,325 3,850 14,169 3,918 33,252 
10,411 39,915 17,986 24,973 10,753 104,038 
*Rrifers to pre-arranged attacks against ground 
targets and immediate support! close support. 
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The importance of this finding cannot be 
understated. The debate waged over the 
effectiveness of the rocket Typhoons and their 
accuracy and resultant impact on the battlefield 
has focused entirely in the wrong area and on 
the wrong criteria. To understand what tactical 
air power did in the campaign requires that one 
determine what the majority of sorties were and 
what those sorties accomplished, either by what 
they did, or what they prevented. It was the 
fighter, in the case of 83 Group, the Spitfire and 
the Mustang, not the fighter-bomber, the Typhoon, 
that supplied the majority of the support to the 
ground forces. It may have been in a form that 
few soldiers ever saw or appreciated but 
nonetheless benefitted from in very real and 
tangible ways. [See Table 4]. 
Of the 403 enemy aircraft claimed destroyed 
by pilots in 83 Group during the entire Normandy 
campaign, not one was shot down by a Typhoon. 
Despite being trained as fighter pilots first and 
foremost, despite being equipped with single 
engine fighter aircraft and despite operations in 
a hostile environment for three months the 
Typhoons of83 Group claimed no air-to-air kills 
at ali.32 Spitfire and Mustang squadrons, often 
flying right alongside them, did all the damage 
to the Luftwaffe. This is as it should be. Typhoons 
were tasked as fighter-bombers. with their focus 
on the ground. The importance in this data is in 
dispelling the notion of the duality of the fighter-
bomber. There were fighters and there were 
bombers but rarely were they the same plane 
and the same pilot on one sortie. 
Table 4 
Summary of 83 Group Operations Claims by Aircraft Type in the Normandy Campaign. June-August 1944 
Month Sorties Bombs Tanks MET Enemy Aircraft Losses R.P. Prob Pilots Dest Dam Dest Dam Dest Dam a/c 
3 Mustang III Squadrons 
June 1.344 1.692 0 0 0 92 63 36 0 17 15 15 
July 1.232 1.016 0 0 0 24 44 28 2 24 11 9 
August 1.805 1.909 0 1 4 151 444 21 3 15 19 14 
Totals 4.381 4.617 0 1 4 267 551 85 5 56 45 28 
12 Spitfire Mk IX Squadrons 
June 7.369 350 0 0 5 296 328 106 9 50 47 34 
July 9.652 294 0 1 27 405 777 161 11 94 46 40 
August 8.483 747 0 0 22 1.826 3.288 39 3 17 52 34 
Totals 25.504 1.391 0 1 54 2.527 4.393 306 23 161 145 108 
10 Typhoon 1B Squadrons RP and Bomb 
June 3.458 2.029 11.830 17 8 141 52 0 0 0 31 23 
July 3.094 2.290 15.351 39 61 60 70 0 0 0 28 22 
August 4.703 3.415 19.264 215 179 1.227 1.386 0 0 1 55 48 
Totals 11.255 7.734 46.445 271 248 1.428 1,508 0 0 1 114 93 
3 Mustang I Squadrons Tactical Photo Reconnaissance 
June 1.120 4 3 
July 1.465 5 1 2 2 
August 1.413 1 4 1 2 3 1 
Totals 3.998 6 4 2 2 9 6 
1 Composite Squadron Spitfire and Mosquito Strategic Photo Reconnaissance 
June 139 
July 144 1 
August 248 
Totals 531 1 
Grand Totals for all83 Group Squadrons 
June 13614 4071 11830 18 17 552 468 143 1/2 9 69 107 78 
July 17643 2487 19349 49 97 516 936 197 13 123 110 92 
August 19012 7295 25181 268 344 3347 5329 63 6 35 140 104 
Totals 50269 13853 56360 335 458 4415 6733 403 1/z 28 227 357 274 
R.P. =rocket projectile: Dest=destroyed: Dam=damaged: MET=motorized enemy transport: Prob=probable: a/c=aircraft 
(Compiled from 83 Group Intelligence Summaries IMW 83/ 15/3) 
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Armourers prepare rocket projectiles for use on Typhoons at Aiifield B5 
(121 Wing, 83 Group) near le Fresne-Camilly, Normandy. 
The examination of results by squadron also 
indicates the actual effort expended by the 
various aircraft types in the fighter and fighter-
bomber role. Despite the efforts to equip Spitfires 
with bombs, in the month of August 1944, 12 
squadrons dropped just 7 4 7 bombs compared 
with the 3,415 dropped by just 3 Typhoon 
squadrons and the 1,909 dropped by 3 Mustang 
squadrons.:1:1 The Spitfire dropped very few 
bombs, fired no rockets yet claimed the highest 
number of enemy vehicles destroyed of any 
aircraft type in 83 Group. Even taking into 
account the strong likelihood of inflated claims 
it seems apparent that the cannon and machine 
gun of the Spitfire proved the most effective in 
ground attack, in other words strafing. As has 
been shown, the wing mounted cannon and 
machine gun in the single engine fighter were the 
30 
most accurate weapon system on the aircraft and 
the only weapon the aircraft had initially been 
designed to carry. The focus on German armour, 
and the attempts to destroy it, proved far less 
successfuL 
The importance of tactical air power and 
the way to garner a true appreciation of what 
it accomplished lies in understanding its role, 
and how it carried that role out. The single 
engine fighters of 83 Group were engaged 
primarily in gaining and then maintaining a 
degree of air superiority over the battlefield that 
would, and did, allow the allies almost total 
freedom to deploy and conduct operations 
unhindered by the Luftwaffe. In this, tactical 
air power was clearly successfuL 
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The question of the effectiveness of close air 
support is not as easily answered. The number 
of German armoured fighting vehicles destroyed 
by tank-bustingTyphoons is demonstrably low. 
The number of German soldiers and tank 
crewmen who ran or cowered after an attack, 
thereby easing the job of the allied soldier, is 
unknown and will remain so. The bitter struggle 
that German forces conducted throughout the 
entire campaign however, does suggest that 
whatever the morale effect was, it proved 
insufficient in most cases to carry the day. In the 
end, it was allied infantry, armour and artillery, 
under a mostly benign sky, that would 
accomplish that. 
The debate on the effectiveness of allied 
tactical air power in the Normandy campaign '-"ill 
continue. To bridge the continuing divide between 
what is "popular" and what is "scholarly," eye-
witness and documentary evidence, from all 
sources. be they pilots, soldiers, or scientists. 
allied or enemy. would appear to offer hope of a 
synthesis of ideas. 
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knowing that they were out of normal 
small arms range I ordered my 
platoon Browning machine gun to 
open fire. This it did with shattering 
effect on the quiet evening air and on 
our own protective barbed wire. 
I do not know what effect this fire 
had on the enemy but it had an 
almost immediate effect on me. 
Within seconds I was summoned to 
a violently ringing phone to answer 
demands from what seemed everyone 
from the GOC down as to why, and 
on whose authority, my MMG had 
fired. When I lamely replied that I 
thought the purpose of that gun was 
to shoot the enemy I received a short 
but blistering lesson on the special 
nature of war in Korea: 
- "Don't fire your MMG unless your 
own position is under attack." To 
which my unvoiced reply was that I 
thought that the primary role of that 
gun was to fire in support of others. 
-"Don't fire your MMG except in an 
emergency or you'll give away your 
position." Fair enough except that 
when patrolling in the valley you can 
identify nearly every UN position and 
few of the enemy's. 
-"Report all activity. unless directed 
against you, before you engage." To 
which my rueful, but unspoken, reply 
was " I wish I had done so in this 
case by which time the enemy would 
have disappeared and I'd have been 
spared all these rockets." 
On another time and place one of 
my platoon's three-man night 
standing patrols had relocated its 
valley position after being sited. Since, 
in the interest of wireless silence, they 
were equipped with a field telephone 
this relocation stretched the 
telephone line back to platoon. A 
Chinese patrol which was covering a 
propagnda sign planting party 
bumped into the wire and followed it 
to where our patrol lay hidden. The 
Canadians fired, at least one Chinese 
fell and our patrol dispersed. The 
enemy artillery commenced a heavy 
bombardment of our hill. 
I reported the loss of contact and 
was about to lead my Quick Reaction 
party (the three trench clearers but 
armed with Brens and Stens instead 
of grenades) down on a search when 
I was summoned back to company 
headquarters to be briefed on a 
fighting patrol sweep I would now 
lead instead. The night was pitch 
black, company HQ was some 200 
yards back and the Chinese were still 
shelling so the whole thing took a long 
time. By the time I had been briefed, 
reviewed a hasty fire plan, returned 
and briefed the fighting patrol and 
started off at least an hour had been 
lost and the Cbinese had flown the 
coop. 
On tbe plus side we swept the 
valley until daybreak and brought 
back our missing standing patrol 
members. On the negative side the 
long time delay in changing plans and 
teeing up a formal patrol resulted in 
a ponderous. overly controlled, slow 
operation when only a lightning 
reaction bad a chance of real success. 
As was often proven in the First World 
War. a small two or three man ligbtly 
armed snatch patrol usually achieved 
greater success than did a formal raid 
involving a platoon or more. It was a 
lesson usually forgotten in the Second 
World War. except by commandos. 
and almost ignored in Korea. 
I should empbasize that none of 
this is in any way a criticism of my 
company commander or battalion 
CO. Both were first class officers. It 
was simply the nature of semi-static 
trench warfare where the smallest 
warlike action resulted in 
intervention and over control from 
above derived from concepts of 
command honed at Verrieres and the 
Hochwald. 
Yours faithfully, 
A.D. McKay 
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